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Introduction
For almost fifty years, the United States Supreme Court has issued rulings defining 
the right of public employees to engage in First Amendment protected speech. 
Although the Court’s seminal decision on this important matter, Pickering v. 
Board of Education of Township High School District 205,1 squarely rejected the 
notion that public employees could be required as a condition of employment to 
relinquish their constitutional rights as American citizens,2 the Court nonetheless 
placed conditions on those rights from the beginning.  Thus, while the Court 
in Pickering recognized for the first time that public employees had free speech 
rights as part of their employment, the Court also held that First Amendment 
protection of a public employee’s speech depends on a careful balance “between 
the interests of the [employee], as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public 
concern and the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency 
of the public services it performs through its employees.” 3
Because there has never been a bright line test defining the scope of public 
employee free speech rights—and because such a test would be virtually impos-
sible to construct4—the Court has returned to the task of defining the bounds 
of public employee free speech in ten cases since first announcing the balancing 
test first set forth in Pickering. Taken together, however, these cases create a some-
what meandering picture, sometimes focusing on the employee as citizen and 
sometimes focusing on the employee as troublemaker. As a result, employees and 
managers who work in public agencies, along with the lower courts that hear the 
competing claims of those parties, might understandably be unsure about what 
speech is or is not protected, or how the balance of interests might be struck in 
any given situation.
The bounds of public employee free speech were addressed most recently with 
a ruling handed down at the end of the Court’s last term, Lane v. Franks.5 That 
case held that an agency director’s compelled sworn testimony, made as part of 
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a criminal trial against a former subordinate accused of 
defrauding the agency, was entitled to First Amendment 
protection because the director’s testimony was speech 
outside the scope of the his ordinary job duties. In Lane, 
the Court distinguished its controversial ruling from eight 
years earlier in Garcetti v. Ceballos6 which held that “when 
public employees make statements pursuant to their of-
ficial duties, the employees are not speaking as citizens 
for First Amendment purposes.”7 The plaintiff in that 
case, a district attorney named Ceballos, claimed that he 
was retaliated against and denied a promotion because he 
had questioned his supervisor’s judgment in procuring a 
warrant and subsequently testified about his concerns in 
a criminal trial. The Court in Garcetti ruled, in a five to 
four decision, that because Ceballos’ statements were made 
pursuant to his position as a public employee, rather than 
as a private citizen, his speech had no First Amendment 
protection. By contrast, in Lane the Court re-emphasized 
the importance of the balancing test originally announced 
in 1968 in Pickering,8 finding first that the employee’s 
testimony was protected speech, and second that the 
employee’s interest in speaking as a citizen on a matter of 
public concern outweighed any concerns the agency had 
about the possible disruptive effects his truthful testimony 
might have on the agency’s reputation.
But how does one know where to draw the line between 
one public employee’s truthful court testimony about his 
supervisor’s judgment in relying on an allegedly faulty 
warrant, made in the context of his duties as an officer of 
the court, and another public employee’s testimony about 
a corrupt state official, made in the context of his duties as 
an agency director? That line remains unclear, because the 
Court in Lane chose not to answer the broader question of 
“whether a public employee speaks ‘as a citizen’ when he 
testifies in the course of his ordinary job responsibilities.”9 
While the Supreme Court reached the correct decision 
in Lane v. Franks, it missed an opportunity to reject the 
unnecessarily confusing exception to public employee free 
speech rights it created in Garcetti v. Ceballos. Is a public 
employee only entitled to speak on a matter of public 
concern when the matter in question is unrelated to his 
work responsibilities? Must he first say, “Not my job, so 
I can comment”?
This article reviews the Supreme Court’s rulings in 
public employee free speech cases, discusses the significant 
departure from precedent that Garcetti made to those 
cases, summarizes the Court’s most recent ruling in Lane, 
and argues that the Court should return to the broader 
standard the Court originally announced in Pickering. 
Were the Court to do so, it would significantly reduce 
the confusion the Court has created about whether public 
employees can speak in court—or in other for a—on mat-
ters that derive from their ordinary job responsibilities.
The Pickering Foundation
As noted above, the seminal decision on public employee 
free speech rights is Pickering v. Bd. of Education.10 In 
Pickering, a public school teacher named Marvin Pickering 
was dismissed for writing a letter to the local newspaper, in 
which he criticized the school board and the superinten-
dent of schools for funding athletic programs at the expense 
of academic offerings. The Court held that the termination 
of the Pickering was an impermissible infringement on 
his protected speech, rejecting the notion “that teachers 
may constitutionally be compelled to relinquish the First 
Amendment rights they would otherwise enjoy as citizens 
to comment on matters of public interest.”11 Instead, the 
Court held, in an opinion by Justice Marshall joined by 
seven other members of the Court,12 that public school 
teachers and other public employees enjoyed the right (not 
the privilege) of free speech. But, the Court added, the 
free speech right of public employees is not unfettered.13 
Rather, stated the Court, “[t]he problem in any case is to 
arrive at a balance between the interest of the teacher, as 
a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern 
and the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting 
the efficiency of the public services it performs through its 
employees.”14 The balancing test established in Pickering 
was stated in general terms, with the Court noting the 
impossibility of anticipating the variety of circumstances 
in which a public employee’s statements might be balanced 
against the employer’s exercise of managerial efficiency. 
Nonetheless, three factors were set out by the Court in 
striking the balance: (1) the parties’ working relationship; 
(2) the detrimental effect of the speech on the employer; 
and (3) the nature of the issue upon which the employee 
spoke and the relationship of the employee to that issue.15 
The Court, in weighing the first factor (the parties’ 
working relationship), noted that Marvin Pickering’s let-
ter to the newspaper criticized the policies of the school 
board—not his direct supervisors, with whom he had to 
maintain a close working relationship. There was neither 
a threat to his immediate supervisor’s ability to maintain 
necessary discipline at the work site, nor a close working 
relationship between the board members and one of the 
system’s teachers. Turning to the second factor (the det-
rimental effect on the employer), the Court found that 
the letter amounted to nothing more than a difference of 
opinion over allocation of school board funds, and that 
the mere act of airing an opinion in the newspaper did 
not substantially impair the board’s ability to make that 
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allocation. Further, there was no demonstration of any 
disruption of the workplace or disharmony among the 
school system’s employees as a result of the publication 
of the letter. Finally, the Court examined the third factor 
(the relationship of the speaker to the matter) and found 
that this factor weighed in the employee’s favor as well. 
The matter of public concern was the proper allocation 
of school funding, which was to be resolved through a 
referendum by the voting public. As a school teacher, 
Pickering was one of “the members of the community 
most likely to have informed and definite opinions”16 on 
this matter. When there is a nexus between the employee 
and the issue, the Court noted, the possibility that the 
employee will make a valuable contribution to the public’s 
understanding of that issue may tip the scales in favor of 
protecting the employee’s speech.17
In many ways, Marvin Pickering was a perfect plaintiff. 
He was apparently a competent teacher, not a disruptive 
or hostile employee.18 He engaged in a quintessential act 
of free speech, writing a letter to a newspaper, acting in 
much the same way as any of his neighbors who were fol-
lowing the school board’s deliberations on a local bond 
vote might have done. He was not a close ally or imme-
diate staff member who reported directly to the school 
superintendent; rather, he was just a teacher in one of the 
district’s many schools. The Court’s opinion in Pickering 
stands as a testament to fairness, and as recognition of the 
appropriate role public employees may play when they join 
the public discourse on matters that affect the community 
in which they live. 
Post-Pickering: The Supreme Court’s 
Rulings on Public Employee Free 
Speech between 1972 and 2006
A review of the seven cases the Supreme Court handed 
down in the period after Pickering was decided and lead-
ing up to the Garcetti decision, spanning the years 1972 
to 2006, reveals the emergence of two competing views 
of public employees who bring free speech claims. Some-
times the Court seems to portray the employee primarily 
as a good citizen doing his or her civic duty and speaking 
out against wrongdoing by public officials. Sometimes, 
however, the Court seems to lean more in the direction of 
describing the employee as a disruptive nuisance, trying to 
transform every petty workplace gripe into a First Amend-
ment concern and undermining the ability of supervisors 
to manage the organization. Of course, the composition 
of the Supreme Court changed over this 34-year period, 
and with it the philosophies the individual justices brought 
to the question of balancing public employee free speech 
rights may have changed as well. The seven cases decided 
during this period are summarized below. 
In 1972, the Court rendered its decision in Perry v. 
Sindermann.19 That case arose when Robert Sindermann, 
a professor at Odessa Junior College (a part of the Texas 
public college system) was denied reappointment. He had 
been an active member of a group of faculty who wanted 
the college to change from a junior college to a four-year 
institution, and had been elected president of the Texas 
Junior College Teachers Association. In his capacity as as-
sociation president, he testified before the Texas legislature 
and agreed to have his name appear in a newspaper ad that 
criticized Odessa’s Board of Regents. 
When he was not reappointed, Sindermann challenged 
his contract nonrenewal as a violation of his First Amend-
ment rights, asserting that he was punished for his public 
criticism of the board and his appearance before the Texas 
legislature. The Court, in an opinion by Justice Stewart,20 
reversed the lower court’s granting of summary judgment 
for the employer, finding that Sindermann should have 
had the opportunity to show that his dismissal was in 
retaliation for speaking out as a member of the faculty 
directly affected by the issue in question. Citing Pickering 
as governing precedent, the Court stated: “Plainly, these 
allegations present a bona fide constitutional claim. For 
this Court has held that a teacher’s public criticism of his 
superiors on matters of public concern may be constitu-
tionally protected and may, therefore, be an impermissible 
basis for termination of his employment.”21 
Seven years after Perry v. Sindermann, in 1979, the Court 
made a slight adjustment to the law of public employee free 
speech claims with its decision in Mt. Healthy Bd. of Educ. 
v. Doyle.22 There the Court held in a unanimous opinion 
by Justice Rehnquist, that when an employee alleges he 
or she was dismissed, at least in part, for exercising free 
speech rights, it is incumbent upon the employee to show 
that he or she was engaged in constitutionally protected 
conduct and that this conduct was a motivating factor 
in the decision of the employer to fire him or her. If the 
employee meets this test, the Court held, the burden 
shifts to the employer, who must rebut the employee’s 
claim by showing that the employee would have been 
fired irrespective of the protected activity. In this case the 
employee, a high school teacher, aired his disagreement 
about a school dress code in a public forum (a radio news 
program) but also made an obscene gesture to students and 
engaged in disruptive conduct in the school cafeteria. The 
Court seemed particularly concerned that “constitution-
ally protected conduct” should not be used to continue 
the employment of “a borderline or marginal candidate.”23 
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The case was remanded, and the lower court found that 
the employee’s teaching contract would not have been 
renewed, even if his protected speech about the dress code 
had not occurred.24
These “mixed motive” cases vary from the circumstances 
in Pickering, in which the employee had not otherwise 
engaged in misconduct or exhibited poor performance. 
While Mt. Healthy added an important caveat to the 
Court’s original holding, it did not fundamentally alter the 
scope of free speech rights of public employees: the Pick-
ering balancing test remained the touchstone of inquiry. 
Also in 1979, the Court was faced with a claim from a 
dismissed African-American school teacher named Bes-
sie Givhan who, in a private meeting with the school’s 
principal, expressed her opposition to certain school 
board policies, claiming they were racially discriminatory. 
In that case, Givhan v. Western Line Consolidated School 
District,25 the Court unanimously held that these discus-
sions constituted speech on a matter of public concern, 
even though they took place in private.26 The Court stated 
that its prior decisions 
do not support the conclusion that a public em-
ployee forfeits his protection against governmen-
tal abridgment of freedom of speech if he decides 
to express his views privately rather than publicly. 
While those cases each arose in the context of a 
public employee’s public expression, the rule to be 
derived from them is not dependent on that largely 
coincidental fact.27 
Rather, stated the Court: “Neither the Amendment itself 
nor our decisions indicate that this freedom is lost to the 
public employee who arranges to communicate privately 
with his employer rather than to spread his views before 
the public.”28 Thus, since the employee had alleged, and 
the lower court had found, that “the primary reason for the 
school district’s failure to renew [petitioner’s] contract was her 
criticism of the policies and practices of the school district, 
especially the school to which she was assigned to teach,”29 
the Court remanded the case for further proceedings with 
the understanding that privately-communicated views could 
be encompassed within the First Amendment’s protection.
We see the first significant shift in how the Supreme 
Court viewed public employee free speech cases in 1983, 
when the Court modified the original Pickering test with 
its five to four decision in Connick v. Myers.30 This case 
arose when an assistant district attorney, Sheila Myers, 
circulated a questionnaire to her co-workers seeking their 
views on office morale, the need for a grievance committee, 
and whether they had been pressured to work on political 
campaigns. She was fired for her activity, and she chal-
lenged her dismissal as a violation of her free speech rights. 
In an opinion by Justice White, the Court majority created 
a new two-pronged test to determine whether the Picker-
ing balance should be applied: (1) did the speech involve 
a matter of public concern? (2) If so, did the employee’s 
free speech interest outweigh the employer’s interest in 
efficient public service?31 
The questionnaire circulated by Myers consisted of four-
teen entries. Only one entry, the question concerning pres-
sure to work for office-supported candidates, touched on a 
matter of public concern, according to the Court. Because 
that question was “a matter of interest to the community 
up which it is essential that public employees be able to 
speak freely,”32 application of the Pickering balancing test 
was warranted. The Court then considered the employer’s 
right to maintain an efficient workplace by removing a 
disruptive employee against the employee’s right to re-
dress unwilling participation in political campaigns. That 
redress was sought in the context of a questionnaire that 
was otherwise characterized as a personal grievance, and 
the Court resolved the balance in favor of the employer. 
Noted the Court in Connick:  “[W]e believe it apparent 
that the issue of whether assistant district attorneys are 
pressured to work in political campaigns is a matter of 
interest to the community upon which it is essential that 
public employees be able to speak out freely without fear 
of retaliatory dismissal.”33
The two-pronged test created in Connick provided a 
means to dispose of free speech claims without having to 
weigh competing interests as required by Pickering, if the 
ruling court found as a threshold inquiry that the speech 
in question was not speech on a matter of public concern.34 
As the majority in Connick explained:
Pickering, its antecedents, and its progeny lead us 
to conclude that if Myers’ questionnaire cannot 
be fairly characterized as constituting speech on a 
matter of public concern, it is unnecessary for us 
to scrutinize the reasons for her discharge. When 
employee expression cannot be fairly considered as 
relating to any matter of political, social, or other 
concern to the community, government officials 
should enjoy wide latitude in managing their of-
fices, without intrusive oversight by the judiciary 
in the name of the First Amendment.35
Because Myers’ questionnaire did include one item 
that constituted speech on a matter of public concern, 
however, the Court applied the Pickering balancing test 
and concluded that the employer’s interests in maintaining 
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a workplace free from undue disruption trumped the 
employee’s free speech right to complain about alleged 
pressure to work in political campaigns.36 The major-
ity opinion is noteworthy not only because it created a 
threshold inquiry that had not previously been required in 
public employee free speech analysis, but also because of 
its abundant concern for the ability of public managers to 
oversee their operations, and to avoid constitutionalizing 
every employee complaint. Stated the Court: 
To presume that all matters which transpire within 
a government office are of public concern would 
mean that virtually every remark — and certainly 
every criticism directed at a public official — would 
plant the seed of a constitutional case. While as a 
matter of good judgment, public officials should be 
receptive to constructive criticism offered by their 
employees, the First Amendment does not require 
a public office to be run as a roundtable for em-
ployee complaints over internal office affairs.37
In 1987 the Court was presented with a case in which a 
public employee who worked as a low-level data entry clerk 
had been fired by her supervisor, a sheriff, for stating to a 
coworker, upon hearing of the attempted assassination of 
President Reagan, “If they go for him again, I hope they 
get him.”38 In that case, Rankin v. McPherson,39 the Court 
held in a majority opinion by Justice Marshall40 that the 
employee’s speech was protected. The comments were 
made in the context of a private conversation with a co-
worker addressing the President’s domestic policies, which 
the employee’s supervisor happened to overhear. Even in 
that setting—a private conversation with a coworker in 
which a public employee made a fairly outrageous state-
ment—the employee’s statements nonetheless met the 
first prong of the Connick test; the speech was on a mat-
ter of public concern. Applying the second prong of the 
test, the Pickering balance, the Court found no evidence 
that the employee’s statement’s had interfered with the 
government’s interest in efficient functioning of the office, 
or had otherwise discredited the office, since it was made 
in private and was overheard accidently by a supervisor. 
In a scathing dissent by Justice Scalia, in which three 
other justices joined, he observed that the effect of the 
majority’s holding was to permit this low-level sheriff’s 
department employee to “ride with the cops and cheer for 
the robbers.”41 Again, however, the Rankin case did not 
alter the basic framework for analyzing public employee 
free speech claims.  
Two other cases were decided by the Supreme Court 
in the twenty years between the Rankin decision and 
the Garcetti ruling. The first, Waters v. Churchill,42  arose 
when the employer, a public hospital, fired a nurse named 
Cheryl Churchill for insubordination after she allegedly 
complained to a coworker about her supervisor while 
taking a break in the hospital cafeteria. Churchill claimed 
that the employer fired her because she opposed a recently 
instituted policy of nurse cross-training which she be-
lieved resulted in understaffing and endangering patient 
care.43 A plurality of the Court, in an opinion by Justice 
O’Connor, held that a government employer has a duty 
to make a reasonable investigation into the circumstances 
surrounding an employee’s conduct before taking an ac-
tion to dismiss the employee for his or her speech.44 That 
is, in a free speech challenge, the courts must “look to 
the facts as the employer reasonably found them to be.”45 
In this way, the Court added a procedural wrinkle to its 
free speech jurisprudence, while reaffirming the Connick/
Pickering two part test it had adopted a decade earlier. 
Importantly, however, the Court in Waters reiterated the 
importance of the third factor in the Pickering test, stating 
“Government employees are often in the best position to 
know what ails the agencies for which they work; public 
debate may gain much from their informed opinions.”46 
At the same time, the Court noted, “When someone who 
is paid a salary so that she will contribute to an agency’s 
effective operation begins to do or say things that detract 
from the agency’s effective operation, the government 
employer must have some power to restrain her.”47 The sec-
ond, Board of County Commissioners v. Umbehr,48 extended 
free speech protection to independent contractors whose 
contracts are terminated in retaliation for speech critical 
of the governmental entity. The standard for evaluating 
free speech claims remained unchanged in both Waters and 
Umbehr: was the speech on a matter of public concern, 
and if so, whose interests should be given greater weight?
Thus, while there were some adjustments and clarifi-
cations to the Pickering standard in the nearly 40 years 
between the initial announcement of the balancing test 
in 1968 and the Garcetti decision in 2006, including 
the significant addition of the threshold inquiry in the 
Connick decision, the effect of the Court’s decisions was 
to create a framework for employers, employees, and the 
lower courts to follow.  That framework may be sum-
marized as follows: Did the employee speak on a matter 
of public concern? If no, then the Pickering balancing 
test is inapplicable and the employee is without protec-
tion (Connick). If yes, then the court must balance the 
employee’s interest in speaking on a matter of public 
concern against the government’s legitimate interests as 
an employer in maintaining a workplace free from undue 
disruption (Connick). Protected speech may arise in a 
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public setting, such as a letter to a newspaper or a public 
forum (Pickering, Sindermann, Mt. Healthy, Umbehr) 
or in a private setting (Givhan, Waters). And even if an 
employee engages in protected speech, he or she may still 
be dismissed if there are other legitimate, non-free speech 
based reasons for the employer to do so (Mt. Healthy). 
As noted earlier, however, the framework permitted the 
Court to emphasize different aspects of the original Picker-
ing balancing test as it announced its subsequent rulings. 
The tension between portraying the public employee as 
responsible citizen and the public employee as carping 
bureaucrat may be found in a number of the Court’s 
opinions rendered during this period. Although public 
employees are often viewed as those who may be in the best 
position to comment on matters of public concern, given 
their familiarity with the public agency in question,49 the 
Court was also quite mindful of the need to prevent every 
workplace dispute from becoming the grounds for a con-
stitutional controversy.50 Stated another way, the Court’s 
opinions recognize both the right of public employees to 
speak out when needed and the need for public agency 
supervisors to responsibly manage their organizations. 
But until 2006, the Court had never focused on whether 
the speech in question was wrapped up in an employee’s 
official job description. That changed with the Garcetti 
decision, as discussed in the next section.
The Supreme Court’s Ruling  
in Garcetti v. Ceballos51
Richard Ceballos was a deputy district attorney for the Los 
Angeles County District Attorney’s Office whose duties as 
a calendar deputy included supervising other attorneys. 
Ceballos was asked by defense attorneys to review the 
statements made in a search warrant in a pending case, 
because the defense attorneys claimed the statements were 
inaccurate. Ceballos did so, and found certain inconsisten-
cies in the warrant. He brought his concerns about the 
accuracy of the warrant to his supervisor in a disposition 
memorandum recommending dismissal of the case. That 
led, in turn, to a meeting with Ceballos, two of his super-
visors, the warrant affiant and other employees from the 
Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department. The meeting 
ended in a sharp disagreement between Ceballos and the 
other parties, and his supervisor decided to proceed with 
prosecution of the case.52 Ceballos was subpoenaed by 
the defense attorneys to testify, and he did so truthfully. 
In response, he claimed, his supervisors in the district 
attorney’s turned on him, denying him a promotion and 
later transferring him to a distant location.53
Ceballos challenged his employer’s actions as retalia-
tion for engaging in protected speech. He prevailed at 
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, which determined 
that Ceballos’ memo, which recited what he thought to 
be governmental misconduct, was “inherently a matter 
of public concern.”54 However, the Supreme Court held, 
in a five to four ruling authored by Justice Kennedy, that 
Ceballos’ speech was unprotected. While acknowledging 
the importance of the free speech rights of public employ-
ees and even reiterating “the importance of promoting the 
public’s interest in receiving the well-informed views of 
government employees engaging in civic discussion”55 the 
Court had originally endorsed in Pickering,56 the majority 
nonetheless found no protection for the employee in this 
case. Stated the Court:
The controlling factor in Ceballos’ case is that his 
expressions were made pursuant to his duties as a 
calendar deputy. . . That consideration—the fact 
that Ceballos spoke as a prosecutor fulfilling a re-
sponsibility to advise his supervisor about how best 
to proceed with a pending case— distinguishes Ce-
ballos’ case from those in which the First Amend-
ment provides protection against discipline. We 
hold that when public employees make statements 
pursuant to their official duties, the employees are 
not speaking as citizens for First Amendment pur-
poses, and the Constitution does not insulate their 
communications from employer discipline.57
“The significant point” in this case, Justice Kennedy 
continued, “is that the memo was written pursuant to 
Ceballos’ official duties. Restricting speech that owes its 
existence to a public employee’s professional responsibili-
ties does not infringe any liberties the employee might have 
enjoyed as a private citizen. It simply reflects the exercise of 
employer control over what the employer itself has com-
missioned or created.”58 In other words, the Court held, 
Ceballos actions were simply part of his job description, 
and he was merely “perform[ing] the tasks he was paid to 
perform”59 as an employee, not speaking as a citizen when 
he wrote the memo.
Clearly, the majority opinion added a significant new 
limitation to employee free speech claims: because the 
employee was carrying out his duties in writing the memo, 
the Court held, he couldn’t invoke the protection of the 
First Amendment, because he was simply doing his job. 
But the majority’s approach ignored two important 
aspects of Ceballos’ speech. First, he did not simply make 
a statement pursuant to his official duties in his memo-
randum to his supervisor; he also engaged in a serious 
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disagreement with his supervisor and other officials about 
whether justice was being served, and subsequently testi-
fied about his concerns with the search warrant—which 
was a matter of public concern. How different was Cebal-
los’ dispute, held in the privacy of his supervisor’s office 
and alleging a miscarriage of justice, with that of Bessie 
Givhan, held in the privacy of her supervisor’s office and 
alleging discriminatory personnel practices? The majority 
apparently found these two circumstances qualitatively 
different, although four members of the Court did not. 
Second, Ceballos was acting in a manner analogous to the 
other plaintiffs in the Court’s prior free speech cases, in 
that he was directly involved in the controversy or issue 
in question, which arose out of the workplace and which 
he documented in his memo. 
A review of the prior decisions of the Court to see in 
what capacity the employee engaged in protected speech 
shows the following: Pickering’s letter to the newspaper 
was written in his capacity as a school teacher directly 
affected by the budget decisions of the school board; Sin-
dermann’s testimony to the Texas legislature was offered 
in his capacity as a professor seeking to change the status 
of the college where he was employed; Doyle’s complaints 
about the school dress code were made to a radio station 
as a school employee who had to abide by that dress code; 
Givhan’s complaints to her school principal were made in 
the privacy of the principal’s office and in her capacity as 
a teacher directly affected by the allegedly discriminatory 
policies of her employer; Myers’ complaints about politi-
cal pressure were made to her coworkers at the office as 
an employee allegedly directly affected by those pressures; 
Rankin’s complaints about the President were made at the 
office in her capacity as a member of the law enforcement 
community; Waters alleged concerns about patient safety 
at a public hospital were made on the employer’s premises 
as a nurse whose work was affected by her employer’s al-
legedly unsafe practices. 
In every case, the matter about which the employee 
spoke was inextricably linked to the employee’s job; the 
employee wasn’t speaking as a disinterested observer of 
public policy, offering detached critique, but as someone 
with a genuine stake in the outcome of the dispute. How 
different was Ceballos’ claim? Not different enough to 
warrant an entirely new barrier to free speech protection. 
He was deeply involved in the issue at hand, but the fact 
that the issue arose at the workplace and as part of his 
broad responsibilities as an employee did not significantly 
distance him from all the previous plaintiffs. 
Further, it is important to note that in the original free 
speech case, Pickering, the Court spoke of the right of the 
employee “as a citizen”60 to speak. If the public employee’s 
right is to speak as a citizen, then the employee should be 
able to speak, as a citizen often does, on matters that affect 
him directly, including matters that arise out of his work 
responsibilities. This is not to say that the employee should 
have unfettered free speech rights, but those rights should 
not be restricted beyond the disruption factors Pickering 
lists. Citizens speak on matters that concern them directly, 
as did the plaintiffs in Connick and Garcetti. And yet, 
Justice Kennedy, defending the new barrier to protection 
of employee speech, stated that the majority’s holding was 
consistent with our precedents’ attention to the 
potential societal value of employee speech. . .  Re-
fusing to recognize First Amendment claims based 
on government employees’ work product does not 
prevent them from participating in public debate. 
The employees retain the prospect of constitutional 
protection for their contributions to the civic dis-
course. This prospect of protection, however, does 
not invest them with a right to perform their jobs 
however they see fit.61
Of course, the Court had never held that public em-
ployees had “a right to perform their jobs however they see 
fit.”62 In fact, as noted in Part III, the Court had always 
held that there was a balance to be struck between the 
employee’s right to speak and the disruptive effect of that 
speech, even when they did so pursuant to their profes-
sional duties. What is striking in this case is that Justice 
Kennedy ruled as off limits any expression that could be 
linked to those items found in a public employee’s job de-
scription, rather than acknowledging the fact that whether 
an employee’s statements arose out of his or her specific 
job duties or not, there is a professional responsibility of 
public employees to object to mismanagement or abuse 
by a public agency if they encounter it. Such was clearly 
the case in Pickering, Givhan, Connick, and Waters. Fol-
lowing the logic of Garcetti, if Bessie Givhan had been 
the school system’s Human Resources Director or EEO 
Officer, her complaints about discriminatory personnel 
practices would have been dismissed as part of her job 
duties, not protected speech. 
Justice Souter seized on the Court’s sharp reversal of its 
previous approach, in which the role of public employees 
as informed guardians against governmental misconduct 
was part of the rationale underlying all the decisions since 
Pickering. Dissenting in Garcetti, he wrote: 
As all agree, the qualified speech protection embodied 
in Pickering balancing resolves the tension between 
individual and public interests in the speech, on the 
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one hand, and the government’s interest in operating 
efficiently without distraction or embarrassment by 
talkative or headline-grabbing employees. The need 
for a balance hardly disappears when an employee 
speaks on matters his job requires him to address; 
rather, it seems obvious that the individual and pub-
lic value of such speech is no less, and may well be 
greater, when the employee speaks pursuant to his 
duties in addressing a subject he knows intimately for 
the very reason that it falls within his duties.63
Justice Stevens, in his dissent, added: “The proper answer 
to the question “whether the First Amendment protects 
a government employee from discipline based on speech 
made pursuant to the employee’s official duties, is ‘Some-
times,’ not ‘Never.’”64 Yet, he noted, the majority opinion 
provided a blanket exception to free speech claims arising 
out of an employee’s official job duties, holding that if the 
speech arose as a part of those duties, it was categorically 
without protection. 
Predictably, the result of the Garcetti decision in sub-
sequent lower court rulings was to thwart a number of 
free speech claims by characterizing the speech as part of 
the employee’s job duties.65 That result has been widely 
criticized by a number of commentators.66
A Slight Detour: An Employee Claim 
brought under the Right to Petition 
for Redress of Grievances under the 
First Amendment
In 2011, the Court issued an opinion in a case that dif-
fered from the line of public employee free speech cases 
summarized in this article but that nonetheless invoked the 
Pickering balancing test: Borough of Duryea, Pennsylvania 
v. Guarnieri.67 The case arose after Charles Guarnieri, who 
had previously successfully fought his dismissal as the po-
lice chief for the borough of Duryea by filing and winning 
a grievance under a collective bargaining agreement, filed 
a subsequent lawsuit against the town alleging retaliation. 
Guarnieri characterized his act of filing a grievance against 
the town as protected activity encompassed by the Petition 
Clause of the First Amendment, and further alleged that 
after he won reinstatement to his job as police chief, the 
town council directed him not to work overtime hours 
and incur additional costs to the borough. In other words, 
Guarnieri argued, the town’s directive forbidding him to 
work overtime amounted to retaliation against him for 
having petitioned the government in the first place by 
filing his original grievance contesting his firing. 
The Court, in an opinion by Justice Kennedy, held that 
the absent a showing that Guarnieri’s grievance and his 
subsequent lawsuit were on matters of public concern, 
he had not engaged in protected activity under the First 
Amendment. The Court found that his original grievance 
simply contested his dismissal, and his subsequent lawsuit 
simply contested his eligibility for overtime payment—and 
that neither one was a matter of public concern under the 
Connick/Pickering standard. And, reasoned the Court, if 
a public employee was not speaking “as a citizen, on a 
matter of public concern” when filing suit against a pub-
lic employer, then he or she could not invoke the First 
Amendment. Because there is a close connection between 
the right of a public employee to petition the government 
and the right of a public employee to speak as a citizen, it 
is appropriate, the Court held “to apply the public concern 
test developed in Speech Clause cases to Petition Clause 
claims by public employees”68 even though the Speech 
Clause and Petition Clause are distinct parts of the First 
Amendment; that is, the clauses are not co-extensive. This 
approach is justified in public employee claims, Justice 
Kennedy explained, “by the extensive common ground in 
the definition and delineation of these rights. The consid-
erations that shape the application of the Speech Clause 
to public employees apply with equal force to claims by 
those employees under the Petition Clause.”69
In Connick, the Court had previously held that “a federal 
court is not the appropriate forum in which to review the 
wisdom of a personnel decision allegedly made in reaction 
to the employee’s behavior.”70 In this case, Justice Kennedy 
elaborated on the Court’s interest in not constitutional-
izing every employee complaint, stating: 
The substantial government interests that justify a 
cautious and restrained approach to the protection 
of speech by public employees are just as relevant 
when public employees proceed under the Petition 
Clause. Petitions, no less than speech, can interfere 
with the efficient and effective operation of govern-
ment. A petition may seek to achieve results that 
‘contravene governmental policies or impair the 
proper performance of governmental functions.’ 
Government must have authority, in appropriate 
circumstances, to restrain employees who use pe-
titions to frustrate progress towards the ends they 
have been hired to achieve. A petition, like other 
forms of speech, can bring the ‘mission of the em-
ployer and the professionalism of its officers into 
serious disrepute.’  A public employee might, for 
instance, use the courts to pursue personal vendet-
tas or to harass members of the general public. That 
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behavior could cause a serious breakdown in public 
confidence in the government and its employees. 
And if speech or petition were directed at or con-
cerned other public employees, it could have a seri-
ous and detrimental effect on morale.71
Because the lower court had not applied the Pickering test 
to Guarnieri’s claim, his case was vacated and remanded. 
It is worth noting the Court’s continuing concern with 
the potentially disruptive effect of employee speech on the 
efficiency of a public agency.
The Supreme Court’s Ruling  
in Lane v. Franks72
The Court’s most recent ruling on the bounds of public 
employee free speech came this past June. The plaintiff was 
Edward Lane, who worked as the director of a program 
for underprivileged youth at Central Alabama Commu-
nity College. In his role as director, Lane had substantial 
management responsibilities, including hiring and firing 
authority and financial oversight of the program.73 Shortly 
after he was hired, Lane conducted an audit of the program 
because it was facing severe budget difficulties, and in the 
course of his audit he discovered that Suzanne Schmitz, an 
Alabama State Representative who was also an employee 
of the program, had been collecting a salary without doing 
any work.74 When Schmitz ignored Lane’s directive that 
she perform her duties, Lane dismissed Schmitz, and testi-
fied truthfully in a subsequent federal fraud trial against 
her.75 However, after Lane did so, he was laid off from his 
position by his supervisor, Steve Franks, ostensibly due to 
budget cutbacks. Lane sued, claiming that the real reason 
he was terminated was that he had testified truthfully in 
the federal trial that led to Schmitz’s conviction.76
Justice Sonya Sotomayor delivered the opinion for a 
unanimous Court, holding that Lane’s dismissal violated 
his free speech rights. Justice Sotomayor framed the is-
sue as “whether the First Amendment protects a public 
employee who provides truthful sworn testimony, com-
pelled by subpoena, outside the scope of his ordinary job 
responsibilities.”77 In a footnote, she stated that the Court 
did not need to address the question of “whether truthful 
sworn testimony would constitute citizen speech under 
Garcetti when given as part of a public employee’s ordinary 
job duties.”78 But, she added:
Truthful testimony under oath by a public em-
ployee outside the scope of his ordinary job duties 
is speech as a citizen for First Amendment pur-
poses. That is so even when the testimony relates 
to his public employment or concerns information 
learned during that employment.79
The Court didn’t take the opportunity to overturn 
Garcetti, but by stating that speech is protected when it is 
based on what a public employee knew as a direct result of 
his or her employment, the Court may well have reduced 
the scope or effect of Garcetti. Indeed, Justice Sotomayor 
emphasized that “our precedents dating back to Picker-
ing have recognized that speech by public employees on 
subject matter related to their employment holds special 
value precisely because those employees gain knowledge of 
matters of public concern through their employment.”80 
Unfortunately, it is not clear if the Court meant to limit 
Garcetti, and there is still a lot of room for confusion. 
Remember that in Lane, the employee testified in court 
about what he learned and could only have learned in the 
course of performing an audit as part of his job, and the 
Court held that it was protected speech. In Garcetti, by 
comparison, the employee testified in court about what 
he learned and could only have learned in the course of 
preparing a memo and disagreeing with his supervisors 
about the propriety of a warrant, and the Court held it 
was not protected speech. The Court in Lane distinguished 
the two cases as follows:
Garcetti said nothing about speech that simply re-
lates to public employment or concerns informa-
tion learned in the course of public employment. 
The Garcetti Court made explicit that its holding 
did not turn on the fact that the memo at issue 
‘concerned the subject matter of [the prosecutor’s] 
employment,’ because ‘[t]he First Amendment pro-
tects some expressions related to the speaker’s job.’ 
In other words, the mere fact that a citizen’s speech 
concerns information acquired by virtue of his 
public employment does not transform that speech 
into employee—rather than citizen—speech. The 
critical question under Garcetti is whether the 
speech at issue is itself ordinarily within the scope 
of an employee’s duties, not whether it merely con-
cerns those duties.81
What a tortured an unnecessary parsing of speech this 
turns out to be. On the one hand, the Court in Lane 
lauds the virtues of Pickering, reiterating the Court’s 
long-standing recognition of the valuable role public 
employees play as individuals who are often in the best 
position to speak on a matter that the general public 
should be concerned about, and adding that the speech 
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in this case was particularly important because it ex-
posed corruption by public official. On the other hand, 
saddled with the unwieldy Garcetti distinction of speech 
that is part of one’s official job duties versus speech that 
relates to or is learned as part of one’s job, the Court 
distinguished the two circumstances on a very thin reed 
by pointing out that Edward Lane wasn’t hired to be a 
regular participant in court proceedings and that Richard 
Ceballos was hired, in part, to do so. Of course, it is also 
true that Edward Lane wasn’t hired to conduct audits 
or to seek out evidence of corruption in Alabama state 
government. He was hired to work with at-risk juveniles 
and to manage an agency. He went beyond his official job 
description and did what a good citizen would do: faced 
with evidence of wrongdoing, he reported it to proper 
channels and testified truthfully when criminal charges 
were brought against a state official. 
The Court in Lane, having first determined that his 
“truthful sworn testimony at Schmitz’ criminal trials is 
speech as a citizen on a matter of public concern,”82 then 
applied the Pickering balancing test and found the employ-
er’s interest in suppressing the speech “entirely empty.”83 
Stated the Court: “There is no evidence, for example, that 
Lane’s testimony at Schmitz’ trials was false or erroneous 
or that Lane unnecessarily disclosed any sensitive, confi-
dential or privileged information while testifying.”84 Thus, 
the balance of interests clearly weighed in favor of the 
employee, and the Court held that the lower court erred 
in dismissing Lane’s claim of retaliation for engaging in 
First Amendment free speech.85
Justice Thomas, joined by Justices Alito and Scalia, wrote 
an opinion concurring in the result, but adding that the 
Court did not address the broader question of “whether 
a public employee speaks ‘as a citizen’ when he testifies in 
the course of his ordinary job responsibilities.”86 Justice 
Thomas noted that police officers, for example, testify as 
a “routine and critical part of their employment duties,”87 
but that the Court had properly reserved this constitu-
tional question for another day.
Conclusion: Finding the way 
Forward by a Return to Pickering
The Court in Lane v. Franks made the correct decision—
and how could it not have reached that decision? As 
Justice Sotomayor affirmed, “The importance of public 
employee speech is especially evident in the context 
of this case: a public corruption scandal.”88 It is hard 
to imagine under what circumstances the Court have 
concluded that speech in this context was not speech, 
“as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public con-
cern.”89 But what if the Human Resources Department 
of Central Alabama Community College had included 
as boilerplate language in Lane’s official job description, 
as Director of Community Intensive Training for Youth, 
that his duties included “representing the College in 
appropriate forums, including legislative and judicial 
proceedings”? How could the Court have then avoided 
the dilemma created by Garcetti? Fortunately for the 
Court, it wasn’t faced with that problem. What it had 
the opportunity to do, and didn’t, was to go beyond the 
hair-splitting distinction it drew between the employee’s 
courtroom speech in Lane and the employee’s courtroom 
speech in Garcetti, and to simply admit that Garcetti was 
wrongly decided. 
Simply stated, the Court go it right the first time around 
in 1968: Pickering, together with its refinements through 
Connick and other subsequent cases, provides a more than 
sufficient framework for analyzing public employee free 
speech claims. Pickering guards against constitutionalizing 
every workplace dispute, and leaves to the judgment of 
public managers the day to day running of public organi-
zations. The Court’s evident concern with the employer’s 
ability to function efficiently has always been sufficiently 
addressed under the old balancing test. More importantly, 
Pickering also protects the right of public employees who 
disagree with policy decisions, or who observe waste, 
fraud or abuse, to speak up without undue fear of retalia-
tion. Sometimes, as we have seen, members of the Court 
seem to be more concerned with one side of the equation 
(speaking up) than the other (disrupting the workplace), 
but the equation, for all its broad wording and purposeful 
ambiguity, works. Even with the limitations of the two-
pronged test created by Connick, it works. 
What the lower courts and public employers and em-
ployees are left with in the meantime, when it comes to 
speech that public employees make in court settings, is a 
very murky picture. Over time, it may be that Lane sup-
plants Garcetti as guiding precedent, and provides a means 
for lower courts to rely on Lane to recognize as protected 
speech those instances in which public employees truth-
fully bring forth concerns about waste, mismanagement, 
fraud, or unethical conduct by public agencies, even when 
the employees are directly involved in administering those 
public programs, and even when the employees have some 
statement in their official job description that arguably 
covers the matter about which they spoke. That approach 
would serve the public interest and return public employ-
ees to the position they enjoyed previously: appropriately 
aware of their duty to report wrongdoing, yet sufficiently 
constrained by the need to adhere to workplace rules and 
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not to unduly disrupt the functioning of the agencies 
for which they work. That would end the need for the 
employee to hide behind the claim that addressing the 
matter in question was “not my job.”
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